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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Louisiana Supreme Court, holding against the lessee in
Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.,21 implied its disapproval of attempts to
preserve the lease in its eleventh hour by unitizing voluntarily
with land on which the lessee had already completed a pro-
ducing well.2 2 Mallet v. Union Oil Co.2 3 was to the same effect.
However, the court in the instant case did not consider those
decisions to be controlling because the creation of the present
unit was "forced" by an order of the Conservation Commis-
sioner. The court observed approvingly that the lessee first
drilled on the leased premises, and, having completed a dry hole,
took prudent steps to protect what he could of his investment.
Perhaps the courts in these three cases reacted to the demands
of the various lessees in the same manner the lessors would have
reacted at the time the leases were negotiated. It is unlikely
that the Wilcox and Mallet lessors (or defendant's lessor) would
have consented to a provision expressly authorizing the lessee
to continue the lease indefinitely simply by unitizing at will with
his own producing acreage. On the other hand, it is probable
that defendant's lessor (and the Mallet and Wilcox lessors)
would not have objected to a provision allowing the lease to be
preserved by "forced" unitization with producing land, with the
understanding that to obtain the unitization order, the lessee
would be required to satisfy the Commissioner of Conservation
that, on the basis of geological data, a unit should be created in
the interests of conservation.
Gerald LeVan
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE To
ALTER MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
Petitioners, Negro residents of the City of Tuskegee, Ala-
bama, sued in federal district court seeking a declaration that an
act of the Alabama legislature, redefining the boundaries of the
21. 226 La. 417, 76 So.2d 416 (1954).
22. "In order to keep the Wilcox lease alive ... Shell was faced, as the rental
date . . . approached, with the alternative of commencing drilling on the Wilcox
land or paying the delay rental. To avoid both of these alternatives, Shell formed
an operating unit in an attempt to cause production from the FT sand to be
considered production under the Wilcox lease. This was very much to its interest
because by it Shell could save a rental payment of $2,750 and at the same time
avoid the expense of drilling a well on the Wilcox lease within the 12 months
remaining of the primary term in an effort to keep it alive beyond that term."
Id. at 423, 76 So.2d at 418.
23. 232 La. 157, 94 So.2d 16 (1957).
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City of Tuskegee, was unconstitutional. Petitioners claimed that
enforcement of the statute, which altered the shape of the city
from a square to an irregular twenty-eight sided figure, consti-
tuted discrimination against them in violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
denied them the right to vote in violation of the fifteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution. The effect of the redefinition was to
remove from the city all except four or five of 400 Negro voters
while not removing a single white voter. Respondent's motion
for dismissal for want of jurisdiction was granted, the court
stating that it lacked power of supervision or control over a
legislature's action in changing a municipal boundary. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Legislative
control of municipalities lies within the scope of relevant limita-
tions imposed by the United States Constitution. Such legisla-
tive power, extensive as it is, must yield to the fifteenth amend-
ment, which forbids a state from passing any law which deprives
a citizen of his right to vote because of his race.' Gomiflion v.
Lightfoot, 81 Sup. Ct. 125 (1960).
The rule has been almost universally recognized that munici-
pal corporations are creatures of the legislature and may exer-
cise only such powers as are conferred by the legislature. 2 Many
decisions have pointed out that the state may modify or with-
draw all such powers, expand or contract the territorial area of
a city, and may even destroy the corporation itself.8 Prior to
the instant case, taxpayers and citizens of municipalities have
been unsuccessful in their attempts to invoke federal constitu-
tional provisions as a bar to legislative change in municipal
boundaries. 4 Thus in the leading case of Hunter v. Pittsburg,5
where citizens of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, protested consolida-
1. This Note is limited to a consideration of the part of the case dealing with
municipal corporations.
2. Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ; Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U.S. 78
(1881) ; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879) ; Laramie County v.
Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875). See 1 YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
13, § 6 (3d ed. 1956).
3. E.g., Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ; Laramie County v. Albany
County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875). See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 390-95
(8th ed. 1927); 2 McQuLiN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 3644, §§ 4.16-4.20
(1949).
4. See Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,
100 U.S. 514 (1879) ; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
See also 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 393 (8th ed. 1927) ; 2 MCQUIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 37, § 4.17 (1949) ; 1 YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS 13, § 6 (1956).
5. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
19611
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tion with the City of Pittsburg because of the increased tax
burdens to the citizens of Allegheny resulting from the merger,
the Supreme Court held there was no deprivation of property
in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, where the only result of legislative change of the municipal
boundary was an increased tax burden to the citizens. The Court
also held that there was no impairment of contract between the
citizens and the municipality as a result of the legislature's
change in the municipal boundary. However, in reaching its
decision, the Court stated that: "Although the inhabitants and
property owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience...
for any reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in
the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its
powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which
protects them from these injurious consequences. The power is
in the state and those who legislate for the state are alone re-
sponsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.' (Empha-
sis added). This statement has been used by courts in many
instances to uphold legislative changes of municipal boundaries,
the courts each time expressing the belief that the state is su-
preme, unrestrained by any provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion.7 That the courts of last resort in the various states have
interpreted these decisions as affording the state unlimited
authority in changing municipal boundaries is illustrated by the
fairly recent Louisiana case, State ex rel. Kemp v. Baton Rouge.8
In that case, one challenge to the adoption of a plan of govern-
ment was that it incorporated a change in the municipal bound-
ary in violation of the Federal Constitution. The court stated
that there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment or any other
provision of the Federal Constitution which would prohibit the
state, at its pleasure, from modifying, contracting, or expanding
the territorial area of a municipality. The court pointed out that
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to protect the citi-
zens from the injurious consequences resulting from a change in
a municipal boundary.9 This same view has been accepted by
the lower federal courts which have acted on this matter, as is
6. Id. at 179.
7. See Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239 U.S. 254 (1915) ; Ettor
v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913) ; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans,
109 U.S. 285 (1883) ; Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
8. 215 La. 315, 40 So.2d 477 (1949). See Toney v. Mayor of Macon, 119 Ga.
83, 46 S.E. 80 (1903).
9. 215 La. 315, 331, 40 So.2d 477, 485 (1949).
[Vol. XXI
1961] NOTES
evidenced by the opinion of the district and appellate courts in
the instant case.10
It has generally been stated that the intent or motive of the
legislature in altering the boundaries of a municipality is imma-
terial." Thus in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co.,12 the United States
Supreme Court said, "if the state has the power to do an act,
its intention or the reason by which it is influenced in doing
cannot be inquired into ... it is quite out of the power of any
court to inquire what was the intention of those who enacted the
law.""'
In the instant case something of a new position has been
taken by the Supreme Court concerning the right of a citizen
of a municipality to invoke the Federal Constitution as a bar to
a change in the municipal boundary. While the Court in the
instant case distinguished and labeled some of its prior state-
ments as dicta, it would seem that the conclusion is inescapable
that the interpretations accorded the prior holdings are now
changed. Accordingly, legislative control of municipal bound-
aries is not an absolute power unrestrained by the Federal Con-
stitution, but the power lies within the scope of relevant consti-
tutional limitations, including the fifteenth amendment. Thus
10. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (1959), aff'g, 167 F. Supp. 405
(1958). It should 'be pointed out that none of the judges involved in these de-
cisions have shown any conservative attitude towards segregation; therefore,
proper weight should be given to their decision.
11. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birm-
ingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (1958).
12. 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
13. Id. at 541. The right to invoke the Federal Constitution as a bar to legis-
lative control over municipal boundaries arises in two other situations. (1) The
rule has been that there is no provision of the Federal Constitution which a
municipality may invoke to prevent the state legislature from expanding or con-
tracting their territorial areas. There is said to be no contract between the state
and the municipality which prevents the state from revoking municipal govern-
mental powers. See Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) ; Pawhuska v.
Pawhuska Oil and Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919) ; Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S.
161 (1907) ; Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U.S. 78 (1881). (2) In cases involving the
rights of third persons who have contracted with a municipality, it has been the
general rule that contracts between municipal corporations and private persons,
like other contracts, are protected from subsequent impairment by state law. The
determining factor is whether or not the state law altering the municipality pro-
vides a remedy for the enforcement of these obligations which is the substantial
equivalent of the remedy existing when the contract was made. If the remedy is
less certain, the obligation of contract is impaired. Thus, creditors holding bonds
of a particular municipality cannot lose their rights by a state act extending or
contracting the boundary of the municipality. See Superior Water, Light & Power
Co. v. Superior, 263 U.S. 125 (1923) ; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 305
(1886). See also Schulz, The Effect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment upon the Power of the States To Control Municipal Corporations, 36
MIcH. L. REV. 385, 401 (1938).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Court has seemingly said that the prior cases have held only
that the due process clause, fourteenth amendment, and the con-
stitutional inhibition against impairment of contracts are no
bar to legislative alteration of municipal boundaries, but that
the fifteenth amendment is such a bar.1 4 This reasoning is at
least difficult to follow in view of the breadth of the language
in the Hunter case, wherein the Court stated that with respect
to municipal boundary change the state is supreme, unrestrained
by any provision of the United States Constitution, and the citi-
zens have no right by contract or otherwise to complain of this
exercise of power.' 5
Possibly the intention of the Alabama legislature was actual-
ly inquired into by the Court in the instant case. It is arguable
that the somewhat extreme result produced by the action of the
Alabama legislature in reshaping the City of Tuskegee into a
twenty-eight sided figure influenced the decision.' 6 Conceivably,
when the situation presented will produce less extreme results,
the Court will return to the position that it has no jurisdiction
to rule on the power of a state legislature to alter a municipal
boundary. However, it appears that in truth the Supreme Court
has decided to give the fifteenth amendment a preferred position
in this area. That the right to vote in a particular municipal
election should be afforded a more favorable position than due
process of law is at least a questionable result.
Sam J. Friedman
SALES - ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO ANNUL AN
AUTHENTIC ACT
Plaintiff instituted suit against his wife and son seeking,
inter alia, to have immovable property which he had transferred
to his wife during the existence of the community of acquets
and gains between them declared to be property of the com-
14. In a concurring opinion in the instant case, Mr. Justice Whittaker felt that
the decision should be based on a denial of equal protection of the fourteenth
amendment, rather than the right to vote provision in the fifteenth amendment.
He felt that the right to vote does not entitle a person to vote in a particular
municipal election, but only the general right to vote.
15. Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). See Laramie County v.
Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 314 (1875).
16. For a diagram of the City of Tuskegee after the redefinition see the instant
case at page 131.
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